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This article considers that the flow of new not patented innovations is difficult to occur among firms, especially when some in-
ventions are caused by serendipity. Here I develop a model to analyze the conditions for a “market for inventions” to exist. 
With the help of game theory in particular, I show that the creation of such a market is quite unlikely because unfair buyer’s be-
haviour and the possibility of expropriation of the new innovation renders the seller reluctant to negotiate with a potential buyer.
So I argue for a solution that involves a third referenced party into the negotiation so that it can guarantee the flow of ideas among
institutions and generate a surplus for the whole society. 
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1. Introduction 
As is well known, innovation processes often bear characteris-
tics that favour market failure. In particular, once the innova-
tion is widespread, its application cannot be excluded. Such a
peculiarity is even sharper when serendipitous inventions are
considered. Such circumstances illustrate the importance of de-
aling with this issue, and the purpose of this work is to derive
the conditions according to which a “market for errors” can
exist. A bargaining model involving two firms and its evolution
will be discussed. In this framework I will not deal with final
goods but with, something not complete enough to be paten-
table. In  this paper I have used a broad definition of technology
drawn from Arora Fosfuri Gambardella (2001) who stated that
technology can take the form of intellectual property, or intan-
gibles, be embodied in a product or take the form of technical
services. Technology is an imprecise term for “useful kno-
wledge” rooted in engineering, scientific disciplines, but also
drawing from practical experience of production.
A two-period bargaining model with and without uncertainty
about the “type” of buyer will be presented1.  Many models
(e.g., Anton & Yao 1994) in the literature consider buyers the
“weakest” link in this kind of negotiation since they suffer from
asymmetric information. Here the approach is different because
it is the seller who has to disclose a new invention is conside-
red to be weak  and who may not have a well-known reputa-
tion. Consequently the “Market for Inventions” will exist only
after the seller makes such a decision. Such choice will depend
not only on the buyer having fair or unfair behaviour (Grimaldi
2008), but also on the presence of some structures that can
guarantee the transfer of the new innovation from one firm to
another one. The work is divided as follows: Section 2 deals
with the possible expropriation of non-patented inventions.
Section 3 tackles the topic of innovation and R&D activities wi-
thin a firm. Section 4 deals with the construction of strategic
negotiations between sellers and buyers and tries to derive the
conditions according to which a “market for new inventions”
can exist. In section 5 the use of a sanction will be discussed,
while, at the end in section 6 the presence of a third indepen-
dent party will be included in the model.
2. Expropriation and Inventions
In recent studies, knowledge has been classified as a key re-
source for a firm and is included in the larger set of intangible
resources. Hall (1993) has defined intangible resources of a firm
as reputation, employee know-how, culture, and databases. Each
of these, according to Hall, constitutes a vital part of a firm’s bu-
siness strategy. Only the development and protection of such
assets can create a competitive advantage for the firm itself. In
his work, Hall (1992) particularly stresses the importance of
skills like employee know-how and culture. With the former he
means intangible resources that result in distinctive competen-
ces, which are capabilities that the organization possesses and
that set it apart from its competitors. By culture Hall means
the beliefs, knowledge, attitudes of mind, and customs to which
individuals in an organization are exposed, and by which they
acquire a language, values, and habits of behaviour and thought.
The culture of an organization both sets it apart from others
and binds its members together. 
Knowledge is seen as the source of Ricardian rents. Ricardo
(1926) used the example of “good land” as a rent-bearing re-
source. Good land produces more per acre than poor land, so
its unit costs of agricultural production are lower. In modern
economies, this idea can be applied to knowledge. As noted by
Liebeskind (1996), superior knowledge enables firms to build a
better piece of machinery, train its workers more effectively, or
devise a more productive work organization. Similarly, a firm
with superior product design knowledge can produce a unique
product and earn monopoly rents. In this sense the concept of
Ricardian rents can be understood. Of course, there are other
sources of Ricardian rents, such as luck and chance, but unfor-
tunately they cannot be managed. However, the fact that rents
derive from the knowledge of a firm means that knowledge
must be protected. For many types of assets, exclusion is a re-
latively easy task. Many assets can de defined according to pro-
perty laws, unambiguously asserting ownership. Think of
buildings, land, and equipment; all are considered property
under the law. These assets can be protected by social institu-
tions that enforce property ownership (i.e., courts), and some-
times protection can be enforced by private tools. Land can be
fenced, machinery can be locked, and so on. But an aspect that
renders tangible goods more protectable than intangible ones
is that they are clearly observable and have finite productive
capacity; expropriation can be easily detected. These different
features have been considered by the US department of justice
(1995) which distinguished between market for goods, market
for technologies and market for innovations. Market for tech-
nologies are markets for intellectual property that is licensed.
Markets for innovation include arrangements in which the par-
ties involved agree to conduct activities, jointly or indepen-
dently leading for future developments of technologies that will
be exchanged among them. This is typically the market for con-
tract R&D and technological joint ventures and collaborations.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2008, Volume 3, Issue 3
1  However there is also a wide body of literature on externalities of R&D and Unintended technology transfer,  see d’Aspremont C., and A. Jac-
quemin (1988), Kamien, M.I., E. Muller and I. Zang (1992),  but the aim of this paper is to focus on intended transfer of technology between firms.
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Roughly speaking the distinction between the market for tech-
nology and the market for innovation corresponds to the dis-
tinction between transactions for the use and diffusion of
technology on one hand and transaction for the creation of
new technology on the other. 
Protection of knowledge underling new innovations, if not yet
patented, is difficult. Property rights, patents, copyrights, trade
secrets are narrowly defined under the law and costly to write
and enforce (Cooter & Ulen 1988). New innovations are diffi-
cult to protect because it is difficult to perceive its expropria-
tion or illegal imitation. Thus illegal use of new innovations can
be costly and difficult to detect. Moreover, sometimes it is im-
possible or economically unfeasible to patent something be-
cause the costs to bring a certain product to the market could
be higher than those of competitors. Development of an inno-
vation can be costly if a firm lacks the right tools, equipment,
and trained people to manage it. Sometimes an innovation can
be better exploited in a different sector in which there are
entry barriers. If a firm has the necessary know-how, it can try
to develop a new invention by itself; if not, a faster way to rea-
lize some profits is to sell the new invention or “error” to a
firm better equipped to develop and realize the product. This
may involve an outright sale of the invention. 
Companied often develop innovations that they do not com-
mercialize, in many cases, there could be other companies that
could profitably use these innovations. Often there are strate-
gic reasons, but sometimes they do not sell the technology to
the other company because Technology contracts are thought
to be inefficient and returns for licensing are inadequate to off-
set the costs (Arora et al 2001). As suggested by Anton and Yao
(1994), when an inventor can rely on patents or other forms of
property rights to protect intellectual property, theory suggests
that the inventor can appropriate a substantial fraction of the
invention’s value. If property rights are weak or non-existent,
the inventor’s ability to capture rents could be lower. Of course,
the presence of instruments to protect products of R&D acti-
vities can help firms undertake costly research, but the protec-
tion of a new non patented invention is much more difficult.
The issue of appropriability and expropriation is a central topic
here. In the next section we will see that the possibility of ex-
propriation makes the “market for new inventions” quite unli-
kely to open.
3.   Innovation, Errors and Bargaining. 
Innovators who generate a new innovation or idea face a stra-
tegic choice about how to bring the product to the consumer.
Developing a product from scratch allows the innovator to
enter the product market and compete directly with more es-
tablished players. Alternatively, strategic cooperation with more
established players – whether through licensing, alliance, part-
nership, or even outright acquisition – allows the innovation to
be directly integrated into an already functioning sector, but it
eliminates the possibility of competing directly in the product
market and displacing established products with the innovation.
Pursuing both strategies simultaneously is difficult. Not only do
most firms lack the resources for a dual strategy, but some key
elements of cooperation (e.g., open disclosure with established
firms) are key hazards (e.g., disclosure allows established firms
to imitate the competitive value proposition more quickly).
Commercialization strategy is thus one of the most crucial de-
cisions a firm makes in terms of its ability to profit from inno-
vations developed from within2. 
As noted by Jolly (1997) technology is essentially a “capability”
that can be used in more than one product. Products are oc-
casional embodiments of this capability. In both cases it is im-
portant to make profits, but the different cases influence the
concept of commercialization. For products, it can be the pro-
cess of taking a design through development, manufacturing and
marketing. For innovations, value realization encompasses a
broad range of things, including all stages of commercial deve-
lopment, application and transfer, the focusing of ideas or in-
ventions on specific objects, downstream transfer of R&D
results, and so on. As such, the process begins before products
are even conceived and stretches out to after they have been
developed and launched. 
Effective commercialization strategy results from careful analy-
sis of the commercialization environment, weighing the benefits
and costs of alternative strategies for securing profits, and com-
petitive advantage through innovation. For most start-up inno-
vators, the commercialization environment has two crucial
elements for choosing a strategy. First, the firm evaluates the re-
lative cost and profitability of pioneering a new product com-
pared to leveraging an established product. Second, the
innovator assesses the ability to control the fundamental kno-
wledge after the established firm becomes aware of the new
technology. Together, these factors determine the potential for
advantage under a cooperative or competitive strategy, shaping
optimal commercialization strategy.
The inventor should thus take care of acquiring and accessing
the manufacturing, distribution, and technology capabilities ne-
cessary to deliver value from the innovation to customers. 
2 In this case, the term commercialization is a broad one that can be used when thinking both about innovations and commodities sold in
different markets. 
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There are five subprocesses in commercialization of innova-
tions: (1) imagination (when a technical breakthrough gets com-
bined with a potential profitable and attractive market
opportunity); (2) incubation (when the idea is proved both
technologically and in terms of the needs it is projected to ful-
fil); (3) demonstration (when the product is developed); (4)
promotion (persuading people to adopt the innovation and re-
lating to the infrastructure that has to be built in order to de-
liver the innovation’s benefits); (5) sustaining (the value can be
realized only if it enjoys a long presence on the market and a
fair share of long term value is appropriated by the innova-
tion/technology initiator. (Vijay 1997)
Another crucial aspect to the commercialization environment
facing a start-up innovator is the degree of appropriability, the
ability to control the knowledge underlying an innovation after
more established firms recognize its potential impact on the
market. Pavitt (1984) faced the issue of appropriability analy-
zing sectoral patterns of technical change and discovering dif-
ferent degrees of appropriability  and of innovation in different
sectors.  In the absence of effective intellectual property pro-
tection, start-up innovators face potential expropriation by
market leaders. Established firms may imitate the new innova-
tion without sharing their profits with the initial innovator.
When expropriation is possible, negotiations to pursue coo-
peration by the start-up are particularly hazardous. Reaching
an agreement usually requires detailed disclosure of technical
information. This knowledge helps the established firm develop
its own version of the new innovation (Gans J.S., Stern S. 2002).
Rubinstein (1982) referred to the bargaining problem as the si-
tuation in which “two individuals have before them several pos-
sible contractual agreements. Both have interests in reaching
agreement, but their interests are not entirely identical”. Arora,
Fosfuri and Gambardella (2001) considered a model in which
opportunistic behaviour takes place on both sides. They sho-
wed that a simple contract, where know-how is bundled with
codified technology (protected by patents), can successfully
achieve the transfer of know-how. Aghion and Tirole (1994)
analyzed the control rights in an alliance between a R&D firm
and a customer firm when developing a new product. They
allow, in their model, the R&D firm to be financed not by a third
party, say a venture capitalist, but directly by another firm which
may intend to use the product or to resell it to others, but can-
not make the discovery independently. In their paper, the point
is to set up a contract between the two parties. The authors un-
derlined that while the ownership of the product can be spe-
cified in an enforceable contract, and the resources provided by
the customer firm may be so specified, the uncertain nature of
the innovation precludes writing a contract for the delivery of
a specific innovation. 
The present work considers something that is not yet paten-
ted and hence easily expropriated once known. The conditions
for creating a market for “errors” made during a research pro-
cess will be faced. The initial idea is that a certain firm is un-
dertaking R&D activity for its own purposes, but at a certain
point discovers something it is not able to exploit directly be-
cause it needs further development in a field the firm is not in-
terested in.  As a consequence the firm considers the possibility
of selling the unpatented invention to another firm that could
use it commercially. 
For the sake of precision, I will try to describe the whole pro-
cess the firm faces after it decides to undertake R&D activities.
In particular if a firm (F1) decides to start an R&D process, it
faces certain costs (R&D expenses) and an uncertain outcome;
consequently it has to maximize its expected profits according
to these considerations. 
Assumption 1: If F1 has already decided on the optimal quantity of
resources devoted to R&D expenses, it has the following expected
profit:
πef1= v(e) [pep - rz - m - RD1]+ (1-(1- v(e)) [- m - RD1] [1]
where:
πe f1 are the expected profits arising from the new product;
v(e) is the probability the firm discovers something commer-
cially valuable;
(1-v(e)) is the probability it discovers nothing;
pep is the expected price it is going to sell the new product;
r is the royalty rate guaranteed to the researcher in order to
maximize his effort;
z is the quantity of the new output sold; 
m is the fee paid to the researcher;
RD1 are R&D activity expenses, including running the labora-
tory and adapting it to a new research; 
As can be noted in equation [1], there are no costs other than
R&D expenses. Production costs are assumed to be the same
if F1 does or does not do research. Here profits and extra costs
arising from a research activity are taken into account.
F1 considers two states of the world: the first in which it dis-
covers something valuable and the second in which it fails to do
so. What the firm is not considering is the possibility of disco-
vering something inconsistent with the research program but
having value anyway in the “market of errors”. 
Suppose the firm finds something that cannot be patented be-
cause it needs further development, and hence commercializa-
tion, by the firm buying it. This paper focuses only on this
specific case. This issue is thought to be a crucial one, since his-
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torically many inventions have been made by chance and others
are scrapped by firms when they are not commercially valua-
ble. The issue is thus to understand if a market for errors exists
and if firms have incentive to negotiate in this market. In fact,
once F1 has something valuable to sell, the problem is that it
must be sold as soon as possible because a new invention as-
sures market power to buyer. Hence they must transact se-
cretly, without making the new invention public at all. A
strategic behaviour can arise between the two firms since the
owner of the invention does not want to give away, but wants
a part of Firm 2’s (F2) surplus, and the buyer does not want to
spend too much because the invention needs further develop-
ment Moreover the two firms face another problem that is
summarized in the so called Arrow paradox (1962). The firm se-
lling the invention must on one hand fascinate the buyer, while
on the other hand not disclose too much because the buyer
may lose interest or steal the invention if relevant information
has been revealed. In this article, I consider the case of product
innovation, assuming that a firm discovers something it is not
interested in and which can be better exploited by another firm
in another market.
In this situation, another relevant issue usually is represented by
the optimal contract between the researcher and the firm. An
assumption is that the researcher is paid a fixed fee and a ro-
yalty; his additional effort thus depends on the rate of the lat-
ter, since a higher royalty creates a higher incentive to work.
Controls are very difficult in this case.
Assumption 2: The possibility of a secret negotiation with F2 for the
transfer of the invention is not contemplated, since the researcher
wants to finish the research and gain the royalty; he is thus conside-
red a faithful employee whose effort can be represented as:
er (r·, m) [2]
Last, F2 has the same profit function as F1, but with one more
assumption. F2 will (or will not) buy the by-product of the re-
search process of F1, which is unable to exploit it by itself.
Assumption 3: If F2 buys the new invention, it will be able to develop
a commercially successful product3 . 
F2’s expected profits are dependent on the price charged by
F1. In the case it does not purchase the innovation, nothing hap-
pens. Its expected profit equation, which resembles equation
[1], must be modified, taking into account the fact that F2 will
produce something commercially valuable with further R&D costs.
πef1= [ppx - rx - m - RD2] [3]
where the symbols have the meaning illustrated above and x is
the quantity of new output sold once the invention has been
bought from F1.
Here, profits depend on the effort, which depends on the ro-
yalty guaranteed to the researcher and the expenses of deve-
loping the new innovation.
From equation [3], the price paid to F1for the invention must
be subtracted.
πef1= [ppx - rx - m - RD2] - pR&D1 [4]
where pR&D1 is the price paid to F1. Assuming that the optimal
contract set up for the researcher works, if F1makes an error
and discovers something unpatentable and useless for itself,
equation [1] can be changed as follows:
πef1= α (- m - RD1) [5]
The price charged by F1 to F2 will be at least:
pR&D1 ≥ α ( m + RD1) [6] 
This represents the minimum price at which F1 wants to sell
the invention, and α is a portion of the total R&D expenses. In
particular if α=1, it means that all the expenses for R&D have
been put on the discovery of such an invention. However, here
α<1 since it is supposed that the discovery has been made by
chance and thus only a portion of the total costs will be recovered.
If the researcher suggests selling it to F2, an unexpected state
of the world occurs and equation [5] can be modified as fo-
llows:
πef1= α (- m - RD1) + pR&D1
Profits of F2 will be the same as equation [4]. Of course F2 will
have an incentive for buying the invention if and only if:
pp > (r x + m + RD2 + pR&D1) [7]
If equation [7] is satisfied the market for errors will open.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2008, Volume 3, Issue 3
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4.  A strategic model of behaviour
My approach resembles that of Fundenberg and Tirole (1983),
although some simplifications have been added. In their article
they analyzed the simplest model of non-cooperative bargai-
ning that captures both facts that bargaining involves a succes-
sion of steps and bargainers typically do not know the value to
others of reaching an agreement.
This is a kind of selection game (see Nie 2007) in which there
are two different strategies. Selection games have been tradi-
tionally used in the biology field, but have been extended to
economics as well. Selection games can be used to analyze the
behaviour of a firm that wants to enter a market and a firm
that is already in it. The strategic behaviour of the firms will de-
termine the outcome and consequently equilibrium of the
game. Another important contribution in the analysis of stra-
tegic behaviours has been made by Sanna-Randaccio and Veu-
gelers (2007). They analyzed spillover effects in the case that a
parent firm wants to transfer know-how to a subsidiary firm
granting or not granting an active role in innovation. If the sub-
sidiary has a central role in innovation, leakages are possible
and competitors might benefit. In this kind of game, whether
or not the firm decides to decentralize, a certain activity is con-
sidered and the conditions according to which it is worthy have
been derived.  
However, the game I am going to consider in this section is not
a “normal” bargaining case. The firms cannot negotiate conti-
nuously because the specific nature of the “good” does not
make negotiation interesting for either firm. The longer they
contract, the greater the danger of leaks. Leaks are to be avoi-
ded because they cause F1’s invention to lose appeal and F2 to
lose monopoly rents to competitors. It is realistic to think of
this as a one-shot game, even if other cases will be analyzed.
F1 can ask for a high price or for a low price, F2 can buy at a
high price or a low price, or either can exit the transaction.
Description of the Game:
The game is made up of two players who do not move simultane-
ously. F1 starts and once it has made its move, F2 makes its decision.
So sequential representation is better that a strategic one. 
F1 has two possibilities: sell the invention at a high price (pR&D1H)
or a low price (pR&D1L). The choice depends on the kind of buyer
F1 faces. If F2 has a high willingness-to-pay (WTP), F1 can charge a
high price; if it has a low WTP, F1 must lower the price4.
If F1 sells at a high price, its revenue will be: 
pR&D1H - α(m+RD1)=a with pR&D1H > α(m+RD1);  [8]
If it sells at a low price:
pR&D1L - α(m+RD1)=b with pR&D1L > α(m+RD1); [9]   
consequently a>b>0 [10]
being pR&D1H > pR&D1L
Of course if F1sells but F2 does not buy, F1could still gain from
the trade, assuming that it can sell the invention to someone
else. 
Once F1has decided on the price, F2 decides to buy or not, and
this decision affects its total revenue and thus net profits. 
If F2 buys at a low price, given that the development of the in-
vention will certainly be a commercial success, it will have a re-
venue equal to:
πf2 = px - (r x + m + RD2 + pR&D1) = d [11]
But if F2 buys at a high price, it will again have positive profits
but much lower than the previous case since pR&D1 will be hig-
her than before:
πf2 = px - (r x + m + RD2 + pR&D1H)= e [12]
Finally if F2 does not buy at all, its incremental profits will be a
constant equal to 0: 
with d>e>0.     [13]  
Two cases will be analysed, the first in which F2 has fair beha-
viour and the negotiation proceeds correctly, the second in
which the buyer may assume an opportunistic behaviour. F1is
assumed to be risk neutral.
This is a typical bargaining approach, widely used in the litera-
ture. In particular the game deals with symmetric and complete
information.
The game can be detailed in the following way.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2008, Volume 3, Issue 3
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Game 1
Players:
There are two players: F1 wants to sell the invention and F2 wants to buy it. 




F1 sets a price p1; F2 can accept or refuse.
If F2 does not accept, F1 can offer a lower price p2, and again F2 can accept or not;
Payoffs:
a if a high price (p1) is accepted;
Πf1 = b if a low price (p2) is accepted;
0 if none of the two prices is accepted;
e if an high price (p1) is accepted;
Πf2 = d if a low price (p2) is accepted;
0 if none of the two prices is accepted;
where a>b>0 and d>e>0. 
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Note that a discount rate has not been chosen, since it is assu-
med that the bargaining occurs over a very short time period.
In this particular game, F1 will always set a high price5,  but F2
will not accept it. F1 will lower the price and firms will gain b
and d. However, the two strategies are equivalent, since they
lead to the same outcome.
Up to this moment, F2’s fair behaviour has been assumed. Now
a complication of the model is included; opportunistic beha-
viour on the part of F2 becomes possible. The model can thus
be changed:
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2008, Volume 3, Issue 3
Game 2
Players:




(0) Nature determines if F2 is opportunistic with probability (1- γ), or fair with probability ( γ)
If F2 is fair:
(1) F1 sets price p1; F2 can accept or refuse (in this case refusal does not lead to the commercial use of the invention on the
part of F2) 
5 Since F1does not know the WTP of F2 and so it will always try to set an high price, knowing that in the second period it has the opportu-
nity of lowering the price. 
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Now the nature of the new payoffs involved in the game must
be explained. In particular if F2 has opportunistic behaviour it
means that it will incur a loss by buying the invention, since it
is not in its nature to do so. So the payoff z is a negative one,
showing this particular attitude of F26.  On the other side, given
equation [6], if F2 does not pay any price to F1, it will have the
highest profits and h indicates this possibility. Finally if F2 steals
the invention, F1will not be able to sell it to someone else. In
this case its costs become sunk and it faces a loss equal to: 
c = - α(m+RD1)    [14]
So for F2 h>d>e>0>z 
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2008, Volume 3, Issue 3
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unfair firm.
(2) If F2 does not accept, F1 offers the lower price p2; F2 can accept or refuse.
If F2 is unfair:
(1) F1 sets price
(2) F2 will not accept any price, since it will steal the invention anyway.
Payoffs (fair behaviour):
a if a high price (p1) is accepted;
Πf1 = b if a low price (p2) is accepted;
0 if none of the two prices is accepted;
e if an high price (p1) is accepted;
Πf2 = d if a low price (p2) is accepted;
0 if none of the two prices is accepted;
where a>b>0 and d>e>0. 
If F2 is opportunistic:
F1 sets price p1; F2 could accept or refuse, but here we assume that F2 will not bargain and whatever the price asked by F1, F2
will steal the invention and cause a loss to F1.
Payoffs (unfair behaviour):
a if high price (p1) is accepted;
Πf1 = c if the loss of the opportunistic behaviour;
b if low price (p2) is accepted;
z if a price is accepted;
Πf2 =  
h if both prices are rejected and the invention is stolen; 
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Intuitively, possible equilibria are represented by (d;b) and (h;c),
and even in this case that the two strategies are equivalent7.
In the first case (fair behaviour) it will lower the price having
(d;b); in the second case, whatever price it asks, it will always be
fooled by F2 who will steal the invention. Given the incomplete
information of F1 (it does not know if it is dealing with a fair or
an unfair firm), before it starts negotiating F1 has the following
expected profits:
πf1 = γ (b) + (1 -  γ )(c) [15]
F1 will start the negotiation if its expected profits are higher
than 0: 
γb + (1 -  γ )(c) ≥ 0;
γ(b - c) ≥ - c; [16]
γ = 
Remembering equation [14], we know that c has a negative
value and so both parts of the fraction are greater than 0. 
For profits to be positive,  γ >                which is a positive num-
ber. This leads to the main proposition of this paper: 
If γ is not as high as required, the “market of errors”
will never open. 
There will not be a flow of ideas across firms, reducing the pos-
sibility of inventing new goods which could be useful for the
whole society; this is of course an instance of market failure. 
The model could be complicated by adding a discount rate for
the negotiation in the two periods, but nothing changes since
the expected profits will always depend on the value of γ. If F1
is risk averse, the value of γ increases, reducing a possible cre-
ation of the “market for errors”. 8
Concluding this section, it cannot be said that reducing the
patentability threshold could be a possible solution to assigning
property rights of a certain product. In fact, as has been noted
by Pamolli and Rossi (2005), a low patentability threshold may
lead just to an increase in transaction costs (especially litiga-
tion and negotiation costs) without an increase in incentive to
innovate. Public policy intervention should thus care about the
conditions according to which this market could exist. I argue
that bargaining in the market for inventions cannot occur di-
rectly with buyer and seller, but should happen through a third
party, a sort of referee. A referee can represent a kind of guar-
antee for both seller and buyer, given that the third party does
not suffer from asymmetric information from either side. This
new institution knows not only the project the F1is trying to
sell, but also the projects F2 is working on. The referee can thus
guarantee the seller against expropriation since it knows the
real ownership of the invention and be a kind of “witness”. The
buyer, on the other side, knows the invention comes from a
certified subject. In this way, the value of γ can be as high as re-
quired, because unfair firms will not bargain at all and the mar-
ket for inventions will open. Hence the implementation of such
a structure (a Technology Transfer Office, for example) may help
the creation of further surplus. 
5.  The use of a sanction. 
In the past section it has been shown that “Market for Errors”
will have very small possibilities to exist thus creating a market
failure. It is straightforward that such a failure will reduce the
flow of ideas across firms, lowering social welfare. The threat of
a high sanction can, at least theoretically, make this negotiation
feasible, but practically, as it will be seen in the next lines its ap-
plication is quite difficult. 
As it has been seen in the foregoing lines, a sanction can be ap-
plied to the unfair firm if it steals the new innovation. Remem-
bering the profit function of F2 it can be modified as follows:
πf2 = px - r x -  m - RD2 - s; [17]
Where s is the sanction and it must be high enough such that
profits become negative, algebraically it means that:
s > px - r x -  m - RD2
Game no.1 can be now modified by taking into account this
new result. In fact, the sanction modifies both the profits of F1
and F2 F2 is compelled to behave fairly and F1can have the same
profits as in the case of fair behaviour and so when this modi-
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(b - c)
7 I mean that whatever price F1 asks F2, the latter will always steal the idea if unfair or buy the idea if fair. So the end of the game is always
the same with respect to the nature of the buyer.
8 The higher value of γ can be computed using a Von Newman-Morgenstern utility function (U = m - ), showing that a risk-averse firm has
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fication is taken into account, the negotiation will take place.
The equilibrium outcome is unique and it implies a fair behav-
iour of F2 and a selling from F1 gaining profits (d;b). This out-
come derives from the fact that, with a sufficiently high sanction,
unfair behaviours will be avoided. In this case the seller knows
that γ=1 this means that only fair players will negotiate and that
the seller knows that it is on the upper part of the game (fair).
This circumstance combined with the certainty of the applica-
tion of the sanction, pushes the seller to start the negotiation.
However this result is difficult to occur since our assumptions
rely upon the fact that the sanction will be applied with cer-
tainty. In fact, as it has been written in the lines above, the cer-
tainty of the sanction is not very plausible, and as mentioned by
Cooter and Ulen (1988), courts are very reluctant in enforcing
such penalties. This derives from the fact that contracts re-
flecting asymmetric information are not perfect one. They de-
fined a perfect contract as “a promise that, if enforceable, is
ideally suited to achieving the ends of the promisor and the
“promise”. In a “complete contingent contract”, every possible
contingency would be foreseen and regulated by the parties. In
this ideal world of perfect information and competition, op-
portunism would wane, given the existence of reputational ef-
fects (since information is costless) and the possibility of private
sanctions. 
Hence the solution of a complete contract that involves the
threat of a sanction is not always applicable, so the aim of the
next section is to suggest a model that tries to solve this prob-
lem form both buyer’s and seller’s perspective.
6.  The “Referee” model.
The past section has shown that the use of a sanction is not al-
ways possible for curbing opportunistic behaviour of unfair
firms. However, as it has been discussed,  the limit of the fore-
going models lies in the applicability of such a sanction; here I
am considering new and not patented inventions, consequently,
a firm may have many difficulties to prove in a proceedings what
belongs to whom. In fact, commercialization of “new inventions”
is a dual problem; on one side it represents a problem for the
seller (as already analyzed above), but it is also a problem for
buyer’s perspective; in fact, many authors have pointed out that
the buyer faces an adverse selection problem given that it does
not know the “goodness” of the invention it is going to buy.
A better solution, other than the sanction, should include both
the buyer’s and the seller’s perspective in order to achieve
more efficient results. A possible way out can be the insert of
a third subject, that here is called referee and that in practice
can be represented by a “Technology Transfer Office”. 
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The structure works in the following way: F1can ask the ref-
eree, to save and catalogue a certain invention that by chance
has been discovered9, F1 does not want to develop on its own.
The referee that, by definition, must be secret, honourable (as
its employees, in order to avoid possible leakage), can start
looking for a firm which can be interested in buying the new in-
novation.
Once a firm is found, the Referee can ask it to “confess” its
R&D activity, in order to not get fooled. When the Referee is
aware that the invention can be useful and it is not yet devel-
oped by the firm, then it can make the proposal for a negotia-
tion between the referee itself and F2. 
Since the referee knows the cost of “production” of F1 and
even the cost’s structure of F2, it can set a “fair” price for both
the firms. In any case if the price asked is too high for F2 the ref-
eree can ask F2 to lower it in order to sell the invention. 
In principle, nothing prevents F2 from stealing the invention, but
this time, the referee which is a public company, is in the posi-
tion of threatening the application of a sanction being a kind of
“witness”, and proving the ownership of the invention. So the
sanction will be applied for sure. 
The payoffs of both firms will be the same as in the case of fair
behaviour, consequently not only a market for new inventions
will be created, but also a higher surplus will be produced.  
Transaction costs and those required for running the public
9 However F1 can disclose to the referee every ideas it has discovered and that it wants to sell.
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company are not considered, because the assumption it that a
higher social welfare will offset the costs just mentioned. So the
only possible and economically feasible equilibrium is again (d;b),
and again it is efficient for F2 to behave fairly, because it will not
gain anything from an opportunistic behaviour. 
The conclusion of the bargaining is the logical consequence of
the signalling effect of the Referee with respect to both firms,
allowing them to be certain of the compliance of obligations
and of the goodness of the “product” bought and the behaviour
adopted.
7. Conclusion
This work started with the recognition that intellectual prop-
erties have different features than tangible goods. Their charac-
teristics can hinder the creation of a specific market for their
transmission and circulation. This is not acceptable from a so-
cial point of view, because a surplus that could have been pro-
duced will not be created at all. The conditions for a “market for
inventions” to exist have been derived, considering the roles of
both seller and buyer. The seller fears a possible expropriation
of its own discovery, since it is aware that once the invention is
known, a buyer will have little incentive to pay for it. 
The introduction of a sanction renders the market for inven-
tions quite likely to open, at least theoretically. However, such
a threat is not always enforceable. What seems more appro-
priate is that the transactions between two firms involved in
an innovation process occur through the help of a third party,
a kind of referee. This is a signalling case that sorts out all the
problems outlined above and helps in negotiating. The presence
of a referee, as already underlined in the previous section guar-
antees both the seller and the buyer being a solution for the
creation of the Market for inventions. Hence I argue for a so-
lution in which a neutral public firm directs the negotiations
and the commercialization of new not patented innovations. 
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